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Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
ABSTRACT
This paper draws together as many as possible of the clues and
pieces of the puzzle surrounding T. S. Eliot’s “infamous” literary
term “objective correlative”. Many diﬀerent scholars have claimed
many diﬀerent sources for the term, in Pound, Whitman,
Baudelaire, Washington Allston, Santayana, Husserl, Nietzsche,
Newman, Walter Pater, Coleridge, Russell, Bradley, Bergson,
Bosanquet, Schopenhauer and Arnold. This paper aims to rewrite
this list by surveying those individuals who, in diﬀerent ways,
either oﬀer the truest claim to being the source of the term, or
contributed the most to Eliot’s development of it: Allston, Husserl,
Bradley and Bergson. What the paper will argue is that Eliot’s
possible inspiration for the term is more indebted to the idealist
tradition, and Bergson’s aesthetic development of it, than to the
phenomenology of Husserl.
This paper, in the spirit of intellectual history, draws together as many as possible of the
clues and pieces of the puzzle surrounding T. S. Eliot’s “infamous” literary term “objective
correlative”.1 Many diﬀerent scholars have claimed many diﬀerent sources for the term, in
Pound, Whitman, Baudelaire, Washington Allston, Santayana, Husserl, Nietzsche,
Newman, Walter Pater, Coleridge, Russell, Bradley, Bergson, Bosanquet, Schopenhauer
and Arnold.2 This piece will rewrite this list by surveying those individuals who, in
diﬀerent ways, either oﬀer the truest claim to being the source of the term, or contributed
the most to Eliot’s development of it: Allston, Husserl, Bradley and Bergson. On the way,
some of the strengths and weaknesses of the term will be discussed. What this survey
shows, with fresh clarity, is that a single direct source for the term “objective correlative”
is not to be found. Rather, it was born out of a trans-Atlantic philosophical conversation
about the nature of objects, a conversation with which Eliot was well acquainted. It was
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1The term is “infamous” because it is indelibly associated with “one of the most critical documents of the 20th century”
namely “Hamlet and His Problems”. Eliot takes “the opportunity to pontiﬁcate on ﬁnding a serious ﬂaw in one of the
world’s greatest tragic plays, and he not only gets away with it but enhances his own reputation and credentials as
a critical intellect in the process”. See Murphy, 163, 247. For examples where the term is described as “infamous” see
Wood; Hartman, 133; Sayeau, 211.
2While this paper aims to be as exhaustive and comprehensible as possible in its examination of the major inﬂuences and
sources of Eliot’s “objective correlative”, some of the minor and less signiﬁcant ﬁgures will not be mentioned. Many can
be sourced by consulting Frank, 317, n.1. For John Henry Newman see Cowley. For Nietzsche see Lees. For Walter Pater
see DeLaura. For Santayana see McElderry. For Coleridge consult Di Pasquale. For Schopenhauer see Virkar-Yates. Further
to this see also editorial note 15 for “Hamlet” in Eliot, Complete Prose, vol. 2, 128, n.15.
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from this philosophical familiarity that he drew in forming his own aesthetic, literary ideas
of criticism. While there are surface similarities evident in the various potential inﬂuences
on Eliot’s term these can disguise what are, in fact, pronounced diﬀerences in the idealist
and phenomenological approaches to understanding the nature of objects. As this paper
will show, Eliot’s “objective correlative” is indebted more to the idealist tradition, and
Bergson’s inﬂuence, than to the complexities of Husserlian phenomenology.
Frank Kermode, in his masterful introduction to the Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot (1975),
describes the term “objective correlative” as a phrase that suﬀers from “imperfect articu-
lation”, theorised in one of Eliot’s “least impressive essays”.3 The essay in question is
“Hamlet and His Problems”, which was written in 1919 and republished in a collection
of Eliot’s essays titled The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry & Criticism (1920).4 In the
essay Eliot writes:
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by ﬁnding an “objective correlative”;
in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that
particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory
experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.5
Eliot develops the term to criticiseHamlet, which he considered a failure because Shakes-
peare did not provide enough content in the play to generate the horror in the audience that
Hamlet, the character, experiences in himself. “Hamlet”, Eliot writes, “is full of some stuﬀ
that the writer could not drag to light, contemplate, or manipulate into art. And when we
search for this feeling, we ﬁnd it… very diﬃcult to localize”.6 In other words, Hamlet is a
failure because it lacks an objective correlative. Eliot writes that “Hamlet (the man) is domi-
nated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as they
appear”.7 Eliot locates this excess of emotion in Hamlet’s reaction to his mother Gertrude.
Hamlet is disgusted by her but his disgust envelopes and exceeds her as a character. It is thus
a feeling Hamlet cannot understand, and so neither can we the audience. The problem, Eliot
contends, is that Gertrude is not an adequate equivalent to represent this disgust. Further-
more there is nothing in the play that Shakespeare can do to express this reaction. Eliot
points out that in successful tragedies you ﬁnd this “exact equivalence”, for example,
you will ﬁnd that the state of mind of Lady Macbeth walking in her sleep has been commu-
nicated to you by a skilful accumulation of imagined sensory impressions; the words of
Macbeth on hearing of his wife’s death strike us as if, given the sequence of events, these
words were automatically released by the last event in the series. The artistic “inevitability”
lies in this complete adequacy of the external to the emotion; and this is precisely what is
deﬁcient in Hamlet.8
This criticism of Hamlet has struck many readers as odd. In the words of Bradley Green-
berg, Eliot produced in his version of the objective correlative a “conceptual formulation
that has proved difﬁcult and often unwieldy for criticism”.9 Kermode, as we know,
3Kermode, 16.
4Eliot, Sacred Wood, 100. “Hamlet and His Problems” ﬁrst appeared in the Athenaeum 26 September 1919, 940–1, see
Gallup, 84.
5Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 92.
6Ibid., 91.
7Ibid., 92.
8Ibid.
9Greenburg, 217.
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describes it as an idea imperfectly articulated, and, as another critic notes, it “collapses very
quickly under analysis”.10 Certainly Eliot, a young and promising man of letters (he was 32
when The Sacred Wood, his ﬁrst volume of criticism, was published) wanted to generate
some controversy by criticising what many would call one of the greatest artworks in exist-
ence. Later in life Eliot admitted as much, stating in his lecture “To Criticize the Critic”,
delivered in 1961, that in his Hamlet essay he was not “altogether guiltless of trailing my
coat: I was at the time hand-in-glove with that gallant controversialist, J. M. Robertson”.11
He adds, presciently, that if his phrases are “given consideration in a century hence, it will
be only in their historical context”.12 While we might charitably argue that the term
“objective correlative” had some merit before it was surpassed by more sophisticated lit-
erary theories that appeared subsequently, Eliot’s application of it to Hamlet to explain
why the play is a failure is hardly convincing. Nonetheless, his dramatic examples go
some way towards demonstrating the meaning of “objective correlative”: essentially, a
great artwork should both convey and elicit the necessary emotional response from the
viewer. However, the term in this literary sense is far more “impressionistic” than
“rigorous”.13
Aside, then, from what one of the twentieth century’s greatest poets actually meant in
this important and somewhat puzzling essay, what is and remains a question is where the
term originates. Did Eliot really create the term himself ex nihilo? Or are there other thin-
kers whose use of the term preceded and possibly inspired Eliot’s own? This essay aims re-
investigate the issue by discussing the diﬀerent individuals who have developed a term
similar to Eliot’s and whose ideas Eliot encountered.
I.
The ﬁrst clue to the original source of the term is given by Eliot himself, with a tone of mild
incredulity, in his 1956 preface to Essays on Elizabethan Drama, a reprinting of works
from his earlier volumes, including The Sacred Wood, Selected Essays (1932) and Eliza-
bethan Essays (1934).14 In this preface Eliot writes that re-reading some of his early
essays, including “Hamlet and His Problems”, he is “embarrassed… by their callowness,
and by a facility of unqualiﬁed assertion which verges, here and there, on impudence”.15
He goes on to write that the “Hamlet, of course, ha[s] been kept aﬂoat all these years by the
success of the phrase ‘objective correlative’—a phrase which, I am now told, is not even my
own but was ﬁrst used by Washington Alston [sic]”.16
Washington Allston (1779–1843) was an American, a New England painter and writer
who died some forty-ﬁve years before Eliot was born. Allston came from Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, and is considered the ﬁrst important American artist to show the inﬂuence of
Romanticism in his work.17 However, like Eliot who was born in St Louis, Missouri but
10Eliot, Selected Prose, 16; Menand, 20.
11Eliot, To Criticize the Critic, 19.
12Ibid.
13“Objective Correlative.”
14A number of these essays had already appeared in The Sacred Wood (1920) such as “Hamlet and His Problems” and “Tra-
dition And The Individual Talent”.
15Eliot, Essays on Elizabethan Drama, vii.
16Ibid., vii–viii; see also Eliot “Letter from Eliot,” 361.
17Chilvers.
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spent most of his life in England, Allston felt deep aﬃnity with the culture of Europe, and
studied painting in London and Italy. He was also on intimate terms with Coleridge,
Wordsworth and Southey, founding ﬁgures in the English Romantic tradition. Allston
wrote poetry, a novel in the Gothic style titled Monaldi (1841), and the ﬁrst art treatise
by an American, Lectures on Art, and Poems (1850), published posthumously.18 He was
on the periphery of the Transcendentalists, having a review of his very successful 1839
exhibition published in the ﬁrst issue of The Dial, in 1840.19
The obvious question is whether or to what extent Eliot read Allston’s work, and it
seems unlikely he had any direct knowledge of it.20 Eliot himself does not seem convinced
that he arrived at the term via an encounter with Allston. The mildly incredulous tone of
his reference in the 1956 preface, the suggestion that he was “told” about this link, and the
fact that he misspells Allston’s name, all suggest a general unfamiliarity with Allston. It is
possible that Eliot was exposed to Allston’s poetry during his undergraduate years at
Harvard, but highly unlikely; Eliot studied literature and philosophy, and Allston was fore-
most a painter and not part of the canon of established poets and writers. Eliot wrote in
1946 that “[u]ndergraduates at Harvard in my time read the English poets of the [18]90s
who were dead: that was as near as we could get to any living tradition”.21 Furthermore,
under the inﬂuence of Irving Babbitt, a Harvard professor, Eliot turned ﬁrmly against
Romanticism, espousing a lifelong commitment to Classicism.22 However, there is a dis-
tinct possibility that Eliot may have encountered Allston’s work as a painter (and thus,
possibly, knew of his treatise on art) through EdwardWaldo Forbes, whose undergraduate
Fine Arts course on Florentine painting Eliot took in 1910. Forbes, who was the grandson
of Ralph Waldo Emerson, greatly admired the religious paintings of Allston, and we know
that Eliot’s studies under Forbes involved a special focus on religious art.23 Thus it is not
unlikely that Eliot had heard of Allston and possibly knew of, or had seen his paintings.
Eliot may also have encountered Allston indirectly; given the Unitarianism of his family
in St Louis and the strength of the St Louis German Idealist and Transcendental philoso-
phical tradition, there is a chance he may, in his childhood, have been exposed to Allston’s
ideas, or even the phrase “objective correlative”.24 One scholar even argues that the idea of
the “objective correlative” formed part of the intellectual vocabulary of thought in nine-
teenth-century New England, spreading beyond Allston to others.25 These links, though
tenuous, make the intriguing, vestigial similarities between Eliot’s use of “objective corre-
lative” and Allston’s less surprising, and suggest these similarities are worth investigating.
Allston uses the term only once, in his Lectures on Art, and Poems. He discusses neo-
Platonism arguing that it has aspects to it which are proto-phenomenological. The
18Ibid.
19Belasco; see also Wayne, 11–12.
20See Jain for an exhaustive overview of Eliot’s Harvard education and inﬂuences. No mention of Allston is made in this
book. From 1909–10 Eliot did complete a course on “Studies in the Poets of the Romantic Period” which was, no doubt,
concentrated on the canon of mostly English authors (see Jain, 254).
21Eliot, Invention of the March Hare, 388. This statement originally appeared in the journal Poetry, in September 1946.
22Cuda, 4–5.
23Under Forbes’s instruction Eliot made careful sketches of religious images from Italian art. Forbes later donated these
sketches to Harvard, see Crawford. Eliot’s grandfather William Greenleaf Eliot was a founding father of St Louis and
noticed by Emerson; see Moody, 3.
24See Crawford for Eliot’s Unitarian upbringing and his encounter with Forbes. See also Sigg, for another account of the
household Unitarianism of Eliot’s youth.
25Duﬀy.
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argument centres on the notion of our apprehension of “Ideas” which are “the highest or
most perfect form in which any thing…may exist in the mind”.26 Objects become con-
scious to the mind, in the form of Ideas, for two reasons, either as “manifestations of objec-
tive realities” or as the “reﬂex product” of our mental constitution.27 For Allston the
“external world” is manifest in the mind because the world is the mind’s “objective corre-
lative”.28 The mind is pre-determined to be cognisant of “objective realities” because it
possesses a “pre-existing idea [of them] in its living power”.29 In addition, the proper
end of this correlation is the experience of pleasure or satisfaction.30 The pre-determined
correlation between the mind and external reality exists because both are located in the
“unchangeable ground of Truth”.31 Evidently, there is an underlying pseudo-Kantian pos-
ition developed here; Allston wants to suggest that the mind is “pre-determined” to under-
stand the world in an intelligible way. Thus categories of the mind cohere with outside
phenomena. But Allston goes beyond Kant, aligning himself with Transcendentalism,
and German Idealism generally, in that he argues that we are able to understand the
world because both mind and reality are grounded in the divine, i.e., “unchangeable
Truth”, and so self-knowledge and self-development can enable this appreciation.32
When we compare Allston’s use of the term with Eliot’s, we can understand his incre-
dulity at the suggestion that his “objective correlative” comes from Allston. Eliot’s devel-
opment of the term is very much literary and removed from the Transcendentalist heights
of Allston’s idealism. Yet there are similarities. Both argue that a mental state corresponds
with external phenomena; and in both cases the proper alignment of the two results in
some kind of experience: for Eliot, a genuine emotive audience response, and for
Allston, a grasp of the divine order of things. Thus when the mind appreciates and under-
stands reality in the ﬁtting way, the experience that follows is one of truth, whether aes-
thetic or transcendent.
In addition to the term “objective correlative”, Allston and Eliot also share some inter-
esting biographic similarities which are suggestive, but tangential to this paper’s main
argument. Both came from a Unitarian background and studied at Harvard, Allston
from 1796 to 1800, Eliot from 1906 to 1916 when he ﬁnished his doctoral thesis while
already living in England. Both were successful poets, although Eliot was certainly more
so than Allston. Both had a complex relationship with religious faith. In 1809 Allston
married Ann Channing. Her untimely death in 1815, while they were living in London,
aﬀected him profoundly. Richard Henry Dana writes that after Allston’s wife’s death he
developed an “undivided interest in spiritual relations” and received the rite of conﬁr-
mation, becoming a devout adherent to Christian doctrine and discipline.33 Allston
remained strongly Unitarian in his religious outlook, stating around 1830, “I am
neither an Episcopalian nor a Congregationalist, I endeavour to be a Christian”.34 He
26Allston, Lectures on Art, 3.
27Ibid., 3.
28Ibid., 16.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31Ibid., 3.
32Wayne, viii.
33Dana, vi. Richard Henry Dana, Sr (1787–1879) was a minor novelist and poet. He was the ﬁrst American critic of Romanti-
cism. Dana is somewhat hagiographic in his description of Allston.
34Flagg, 245–6.
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notes in one of his letters written in 1830 that he was especially drawn to paint Biblical
subjects and that the Scripture was a “source of inspiration” for his art.35 There is
much evidence for this in his paintings, many of which depict religious events.
Eliot’s conversion circumstances were somewhat diﬀerent.36 When he very deliberately
converted to Anglo-Catholicism in 1927, he was nearly estranged from his ﬁrst wife, Vivi-
enne Haigh-Wood. Their tumultuous and dysfunctional marriage was maintained with
the barest façade of domesticity until 1932, when he went to America to deliver the
Charles Eliot Norton poetry lectures at Harvard. When he returned to England in 1933
he separated from Vivienne and gradually immersed himself fully in the life of his
parish, St Stephen’s in Kensington, with a level of devotion akin to a tertiary member
of a religious order.37 Like Allston, Eliot after his conversion was deeply inspired and
inﬂuenced by his Christianity, producing in Four Quartets (1939–42) a poetic testament
to his struggle with and redemption through faith. There is a remote possibility that
Eliot may have been drawn to Allston’s work if he learnt of the similarities between
their life experiences. However, Eliot’s essay on Hamlet, where the term “objective corre-
lative” appears, was published in 1919, nearly a decade before he converted to Anglo-Cath-
olicism. Thus, if Eliot had read Allston’s letters, lectures or poems for some kind of solace
during his own spiritual and domestic struggles, it would have been after the publication of
the Hamlet essay, and thus of no consequence to this argument.
II.
Keeping in chronological order, as far as is possible, the next person to consider is the phi-
losopher Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924), on whom Eliot wrote his PhD thesis.38
Bradley, based at Oxford University, was Britain’s last signiﬁcant neo-Hegelian,
working in the tradition of German Idealism before it was eclipsed by the advent of
modern logic and analytic philosophy. Eliot personally experienced this change in
British philosophy, since he wrote on Bradley but then, for a time, came under the
inﬂuence of Bertrand Russell.39 Eliot’s debt to Bradley can be overstated; Anne
C. Bolgan, for example, claims that
it is patently clear to anyone who has studied the work of both [Eliot and Bradley] that it is
Bradley’s mind that lies behind the structuring principles of Eliot’s poetry, as well as every
major theoretical concept appearing in his literary criticism.40
This is a claim far too general to be effectively substantiated, given the breadth of Eliot’s
learning. Bolgan’s idea that Eliot’s works show a “structuring principle” grounded in Brad-
ley’s Hegelian holism is suggestive, however. Simply put, holism is the belief that “the
meaning of any thing is never autonomously given but is always a function of its place
35Ibid., 233.
36The question of whether Unitarianism is indeed a form of Christianity is historically complex. See Ahlstrom’s masterful A
Religious History of the American People for a chronological overview of its development.
37Spurr, 115–16.
38Eliot, Knowledge and Experience. See Mallinson for a sustained examination of Eliot’s engagement with Bradley.
39Russell’s inﬂuence on Eliot was formative and equivocal; see Shusterman “Eliot as Philosopher,” 35–8. Some scholars
have tried to argue, unconvincingly, that Eliot’s “objective correlative” shows Russell’s inﬂuence; see Green, 155; Shuster-
man, “Eliot and Logical Atomism”; also Skaﬀ. Like Habib, 271, I think these positions overstated.
40Bolgan, 253. Bolgan was instrumental in the formal publication of Eliot’s PhD in 1964.
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and interrelations with other things in a wider whole”.41 This notion can be seen in Eliot’s
thinking about the nature of the literary canon, for example, in “Tradition and the Indi-
vidual Talent” (1917) where he declares that “the historical sense compels a man to write
not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the
literature of Europe… has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous
order”.42
Given this deep sympathy of thought, a parallel between Eliot’s “objective correlative”
and aspects of Bradley’s ideas would not be surprising.43 The term itself does not appear in
Bradley’s work, but we can discern clear lines of thought which echo it. For example, in
Bradley’s Essays on Truth and Reality (1914), parts of which Eliot quotes in his PhD
thesis, Bradley writes that “every idea, even of failure, works successfully in producing a
corresponding attitude or other change in my body or some part of it.… [T]o speak in
general, an idea tends thus to express itself emotionally”.44 This claim about the relational
nature of ideas and their corresponding emotional eﬀect on the body is very much in line
with Eliot’s own claims. Bradley goes on to write that in
any emotion one part of that emotion consists already of objects, of perceptions and ideas
before my mind. And, the whole emotion being one, the special group of feeling is united
with these objects before my mind, united with them integrally and directly.… There are fea-
tures in feeling which already in a sense belong to and are one with their object, since the
emotion contains and unites both its aspects.45
If we consider these ideas in light of Eliot’s “objective correlative” there are similarities.
While Bradley is concerned with the individual’s own experience of ideas and their
relation to emotion within an idealist framework, Eliot is concerned with how the artist
is able to effectively convey her ideas (which are associated with a particular emotion)
to the audience via the artwork. Bradley continues:
when a felt emotion is described, a man may feel that the description agrees or does not agree
with an actual fact of which he is aware.…And it is, largely or mainly, because these sugges-
tions are felt to be in unison or discord with something already felt as present, that they are
accepted or rejected.46
Here again we can discern an echo in Eliot’s work, particularly with regard to the failure of
an artwork, such as Hamlet, which lacks an “objective correlative”. The artist conveys an
emotion through the artwork in order to evoke that emotional response in the audience.
The “object” of that emotion, in Eliot’s case the character Gertrude, fails to elicit the
emotions of loathing and disgust, and thus there is no accord with the audience.
The last suggestive link to Bradley is a point Eliot develops in his own thesis, in agree-
ment with a position developed by Bradley.47 Essentially Eliot claims that “emotion is
really part of the object, and is ultimately just as objective”.48 Emotional experiences are
not pure abstractions, but psychical phenomena attached to physical structures. For
41Shusterman, “Eliot as Philosopher,” 33.
42Eliot, Sacred Wood, 44.
43See Frank, 311–17, for a relatively unsuccessful attempt to locate this parallel.
44Bradley, Essays, 80, n.1.
45Ibid., 169. Eliot quotes this passage in his thesis. See Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 24.
46Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 185.
47Bradley, “Defence of Phenomenalism.”
48Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 80.
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example, to recall an object which is associated with pleasure is also to recall the experience
of pleasure; the object and the emotion correlate.
III.
Another important source for Eliot’s “objective correlative” comes from the work of the
founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938).49 Again, the link can be over-
estimated; Sanford Schwartz, for example, claims that Eliot deliberately and consciously
lifts the term from Husserl.50 Husserl does uses the phrase “objective correlate” [objektive
Korrelat], which appears numerous times in his Logical Investigations (1900/1). Eliot read
Husserl’s Logical Investigations in its second, 1913 German edition; his annotated copy of
Logische Untersuchungen is in the London library.51 Signiﬁcantly this edition does not
include the second part of the second volume, containing the Sixth Investigation, which
was included in the ﬁrst, 1900/1 edition and only again in the 1921 edition.52 Unable to
revise the Sixth Investigation in 1913 as he intended Husserl withheld it, and sent only
the ﬁrst ﬁve investigations to press. These make up the two volumes of the book Eliot
read.53 In the 1913 edition, without the Sixth Investigation, the term objektive Korrelat
appears only four times,54 though in the Sixth Investigation, which Eliot did not have,
it appears more frequently.
Eliot read the book while on a travelling fellowship to attend a summer programme
for foreign students at Marburg University in the spring of 1914, ﬁve years before the
publication of the Hamlet essay. At this period, all “student[s] of Idealism” at Harvard
were expected to spend time at German universities.55 He did not personally study with
Husserl, who at this stage of his ascending career was still at the University of Göttin-
gen. Eliot was in Germany only very brieﬂy as the events of Sarajevo began to engulf
Europe barely a month after he arrived. He left Germany on 3 August 1914.56 He
started reading Logical Investigations while in Marburg, since he mentions the book’s
title in a letter (dated 25 July 1914) which he sent to Conrad Aiken, his closest
early friend and fellow student at Harvard.57 That the letter is to a fellow student
perhaps explains why Eliot refers to the book only by its German title, and in
passing. He is more expansive about Husserl’s work again in a letter dated 5
October 1914, addressed to his Harvard Professor of Philosophy, J. M. Woods. Eliot
writes, “I have been plugging away at Hüsserl, and ﬁnd it terribly hard, but very
49See Kumar for an interesting overview of Eliot’s own phenomenology, as developed in his doctoral thesis, and its relation
to Husserl.
50Schwartz, 9.
51The weathered edition of Eliot’s Logische Untersuchungenwas presented to the London Library by Mrs Michael Roberts in
March 1952. On the title page is a faint, pencilled inscription: “T. S. Eliot, Marburg 1914”.
52Moran, lxvi, n.1.
53Ibid., xxxvill.
54In the 1913 edition the term objective Korrelat appears in volume 1, on page 134 as objektives Korrelat and on page 186,
objektiven Korrelaten. In volume 2 it appears on page 25, objective Korrelat and on page 460, objektives Korrelat.
55Kirk, 29; Gordon, 95. Eliot had barely settled into life at Marburg when the First World War broke out and he left for
Britain; see the introduction by Brooker and Schuchard in Eliot, Complete Prose, vol. 1, xli–xliii for an account of
Eliot’s transition from Marburg to London, and his being interviewed by the New York Times in this regard.
56Gordon, 96. Phenomenology had by 1914 attained a huge following in Germany and by the 1920s Husserl was the
leading philosopher in Germany, until his work was eclipsed by that of his student, Martin Heidegger, with the publi-
cation of Being and Time (1927).
57Eliot, Letters, vol. 1, 49.
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interesting; and I like very much what I think I understand of it”.58 This letter to
Woods was written from Merton College, Oxford, showing that Eliot continued his
study of Husserl after he left Germany.
In the English translation of Logical Investigations the phrase “objective correlate” often
stands in for two distinct German terms used by Husserl, namely the more direct objektive
Korrelat and also Gegenständlichkeit Korrelat. The latter term, particularly Gegenstand
(object) is common in the Logische Untersuchungen. Eliot would also have been
thoroughly familiar with it through the work of Alexius Meinong, known for his theory
of objects (Gegenstandstheorie). In a letter written in 1956 Eliot indicates that at the
same time he was reading Husserl he was also reading Meinong.59 He makes substantial
references to Meinong’s theory in numerous graduate essays and his PhD thesis particu-
larly.60 In the English translation of the Logical Investigations the translator makes the
point that “objectivity” would be the more direct translation of Gegenständlichkeit, but
this term can imply that Husserl limits his understanding of objects only to physical
things, whereas in fact he means to include “states of aﬀairs, properties, and non-indepen-
dent forms”.61 Thus, as we will see from the discussion below, the term “objective” is pre-
ferred, and gives a better sense of what Husserl means.
In the First Investigation Husserl distinguishes between categories of meaning and
objective categories, arguing that the latter are “objective correlates” of the former.62
His focus is on the nature of expression, and he writes that each expression
not merely says something, but says it of something: it not only has a meaning, but refers to
certain objects.… But the object never coincides with the meaning. Both, of course, only
pertain to an expression in virtue of the mental acts which give it sense.63
The language we use to speak about objects makes sense because there is an intentional,
conscious relation between our expression about the object and the object itself. However,
this relationship is in no way ﬁxed, but only a correlation, which is dependent on the
mental act which establishes the relation.
Husserl uses the example of diﬀerent languages which express the same object, for
example, “London”, “Londres”, “伦敦 (Lúndūn)” to show this.64 This phenomenon is sig-
niﬁcant for Husserl because it draws attention to an expression’s
meaning and its power to direct itself as a name to this or that objective correlate … an
expression only refers to an objective correlate because it means something[;] it can be
rightly said to signify or name the object through its meaning.65
58Ibid., vol. 1, 65. Eliot’s own annotations in his copy of Logische Untersuchungen seem to conﬁrm this diﬃculty. In volume
2 on pages 348–50 we see the words “Rubbish” and “What the devil does this mean?” added to the text.
59Eliot, Complete Prose, vol. 2, 731–2, n. 6.
60Three of Eliot’s graduate essays Degrees of Reality, Suggestions toward a Theory of Objects and The Validity of Artiﬁcial
Distinctions feature or allude to Meinong’s theory of objects, and he is mentioned substantially in Eliot’s PhD thesis.
Also, in Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation, which Eliot studied at Harvard, the term “objective corre-
lative” appears once as “objective Korrelat”. See Schopenhauer, The World as Will, 216; Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille,
453. See also Virkar-Yates.
61Findlay, translator’s note in Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, 321.
62Ibid., vol. 1, 196 onwards; for the German see Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, 46. See also Steadman,
262.
63Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, 197.
64Ibid. See also Simons, 111.
65Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, 198.
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An expression is an act of meaning directed at something, but this does not ﬁx the
expression to the object. The context and inter-subjective nature of an expression are
part of why it is meaningful, and these can change. However, these acts intend the “objec-
tive correlate of our act of meaning” to stand before us intuitively as the “very object we
mean”.66
Aside from the philosophic discussion to explore Husserl’s terminology there is some
tantalising marginalia on page 25 of the second volume of Eliot’s copy of Logische Unter-
suchungen where the term objektive Korrelat appears. Eliot has underlined some of the
sentences, though not the term itself. Here, I quote each sentence entirely and indicate
what is underlined:
A thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate something to
some thinking being.67 … In these we discover as a common circumstance the fact that
certain objects or states of aﬀairs of whose reality someone has actual knowledge indicate
to him the reality of certain other objects or states of aﬀairs, in the sense that his belief in
the reality of the one is experienced (though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or
surmise in the reality of the other.68 … Plainly such a state of aﬀairs amounts to just this:
that certain things may or must exist, since other things have been given. This “since”,
taken as expressing an objective connection, is the objective correlate of “motivation”
taken as a descriptively peculiar way of combining acts of judgement into a single act of
judgement.69
In this section Husserl discusses the relationship between signs, which are indicative of a
state of affairs, and our judgement which results from making inferences from these signs.
He argues that there is always a broader context of meaning, based on previous acts of
judgement, which informs current judgements. However, this exists as a “unity of judge-
ments”, an “objective correlate” between previous judgements and the current one.70 We
can see that this is similar to what has already been discussed with regard to language,
mental acts and their contexts. Our intentional relationship with the world is always
already grounded in layers of meaning which inform, and are an inextricable part of what-
ever particular speech act or act of judgement we are attentive to in the moment.
The term is signiﬁcant at two further points in Husserl’s book. In the First Investigation
it appears again at a later stage, used in much the same way as described only now Husserl
is discussing the nature of “pure logic”.71 Pure logic is arrived at through the phenomen-
ological reduction of “concepts, judgements, and syllogisms” to their “ideal unities”. This
reduction is achieved through detaching the “ideal essence of meanings” from their
“psychological and grammatical connections”, essentially disengaging these essences
66Ibid., 200.
67Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, 184. This is underlined horizontally. The underlined German is “einem denkenden
Wesen”; Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, 25.
68Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, 184. This section is highlighted by a vertical line in the margin. In the German
version this section is not italicised. The German is “den Umstand, daß irgendwelche Gegenstände oder Sachverhalte,
von deren Bestand jemand aktuelle Kenntnis hat, ihm den Bestand gewisser anderer Gegenstände oder Sachverhalte in
dem Sinne anzeigen, daß die Überzeugung von dem Sein der einen von ihm als Motiv (und zwar als ein nichteinsichtiges
Motiv) erlebt wird für die Überzeugung oder Vermutung vom Sein der anderen”; Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen,
Zweiter Band, 25.
69Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, 184. This is underlined horizontally. The underlined German is “Dieses ,,well“, als
Ausdruck eines sachlichen Zusammenhanges aufgefaßt”; Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, 25.
70Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, 184.
71Ibid., 224. This English edition is published in two separate volumes. Part of volume 2, which is where this discussed
material comes from, is included in the ﬁrst volume.
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from the “objective correlates that they mean”.72 This ideal domain is that of pure logic,
the nomological science of which modern symbolic logic is an example. The ﬁnal substan-
tive discussion of “objective correlate” occurs in the Sixth Investigation, which was not
included in Eliot’s edition. An important section here is §43 which is titled “The Objective
Correlates of Categorical Forms Are Not ‘Real’ Moments”.73 Husserl makes a technical
philosophical point about Kantian categorical forms such as quantity and quality. Essen-
tially he argues that forms such as these, like symbolic logic, have no “objective correlates”
themselves in terms of objects occurring in the “real”, i.e. external world. For example,
though the quality of smoothness or abrasiveness is part of an object such as a wooden
surface, “smoothness” itself has no objective correlate as such.74
From this initial discussion it is clear that there are some superﬁcial similarities but
perhaps more importantly signiﬁcant diﬀerences between Eliot’s “objective correlative”
and Husserl’s “objective correlate”. There is certainly a level of sophistication and detail
in Husserl’s account which is lacking in Eliot’s. For Husserl, meaning is possible
because of mental acts and their contexts which establish an intentional link between
an expression and its object, thus allowing them to “correlate” meaningfully. On this
level the relationship is “objective” in a scientiﬁc sense because the correlation is always
between mental acts and their contexts. For a phenomenologist, every mind which
thinks, thinks in this direct, intentional way. When we interrogate this fundamental orien-
tation we have with the world, what is revealed is this phenomenological arrangement. On
another level, what is also revealed is our own historicity and worldhood, what Martin
Heidegger calls “thrownness” (Geworfenheit), which is subjective and seemingly arbitrary.
We ﬁnd ourselves already in meaning, in language and in a context which makes the world
cohere and orientates us in it. Husserl shows that language allows us to direct and articu-
late our conscious thoughts to the objects around us such that there is a correlation
between what is thought and what is meant. Language is the interpretive “glue” which
sticks the mental act and the physical phenomenon together. But the language is itself con-
textual and forms part of a particular worldview and worldhood.
Eliot also argues for a correlation, but in a less rigorous way than Husserl. In his PhD
Eliot holds that emotions cohere in objects and that if the artist arranges these objects
properly she will evoke the desired response in the audience. However, these claims are
more ambiguous because of their uninterrogated naive idealism. Eliot’s “objective corre-
lative” seems to imply, like Husserl to some extent, that “objective” should be understood
in its proper, scientiﬁc sense, suggesting that there are underlying, universal objects which
can evoke the desired emotional response from an audience, or fail to. But, unlike Husserl,
Eliot does not develop this position at all, which is deeply problematic because it overlooks
the hermeneutic dimension that plays a role in all human experience, particularly in the
appreciation and interpretation of art. In addition, Eliot’s term commits the intentional
fallacy, for it assumes that authorial intent and audience reception should be directly con-
nected via the artwork—that there should, in fact, be an “objective” correlation.
Yet, and perhaps this shows up why Eliot was more an artist than philosopher, if we
read his famous essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” written in 1917, two years
72Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, 224.
73Ibid., vol. 2, 277.
74Ibid., vol. 2, 277–8.
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before the Hamlet essay, he seems to contradict what he claims in 1919.75 In the earlier
essay he writes that the “progress of the artist is a continual self-sacriﬁce, a continual
extinction of personality… to something which is more valuable”.76 The creation of the
artist is a process of “depersonalization”, “an escape from personality”; “the more
perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suﬀers and
the mind which creates”.77 Here Eliot argues that the creation of the artwork ultimately
exists independently of the personality of its creator, a central tenet of New Criticism,
of which he is considered a founder. But in the Hamlet essay he seems to hold the
artist personally responsible for her ability to evoke the proper emotive response in the
audience, which, as we shall see below, is a position shared with Bergson.
In spite of the somewhat “unwieldy” nature of Eliot’s early criticism it is worth noting the
general currency these ideas had. For example, Heidegger, a direct contemporary of Eliot,
wrote in 1935 that “in great art the artist remains something inconsequential in comparison
with the work—almost like a passageway which, in the creative process, destroys itself for the
sake of the coming forth of the work”.78 He echoes these sentiments again in 1955, writing
about the composer Conradin Kreutzer, that the artist’s presence in the work is the “only
true presence. The greater the master, the more completely his person vanishes behind
his work”.79 These claims resonate with Eliot’s own claims about artist depersonalisation.
Also suggestive, although tangential to a discussion of Eliot, is the fact that the term
“objective correlate” (Gegenständliche Korrelat) appears in Heidegger’s work. When
Husserl transferred to the University of Freiburg from Göttingen in 1916, Heidegger
worked as his assistant from 1919 to 1923 before transferring to Marburg. It is perhaps
no surprise then that ideas reminiscent of the “objective correlate” appear in Heidegger’s
early work. Heidegger uses the term “objective correlate” in a strongly critical review essay
of Karl Jaspers’s recently published Psychology of Worldviews (1919).80 This essay, though
written between 1919 and 1920, was only published in 1972 after a copy of it was found
among Jaspers’s papers after his death in 1969. Heidegger had written the draft and sent it
to Jaspers, Husserl and Heinrich Rickert in 1921 but, for unknown reasons, decided not to
publish it at that time.81
In the essay Heidegger criticises Jaspers’s “preconception” that the subject, in order to
understand the “object” or “whole” of reality, requires a “theoretical, observational atti-
tude” as a “correlative” way of understanding it.82 For Heidegger this preconception
implies that the “fundamental characteristic of the objective correlate of this theoretical
attitude lies in the fact that it is an objective thing”.83 This is precisely the problem for Hei-
degger: Jaspers’s initial approach to psychical life is based on a preconception about the
nature of psychical life which already forms part of the “objective” and “primordial”
75It is somewhat ironic that both these essays appeared in print in the same year, 1919, even though they appear to con-
tradict one another. “Tradition and the Individual Talent” was published in The Egoist, a London literary review; see
Murphy, 405.
76Eliot, Sacred Wood, 47.
77Ibid., 47–8, 52.
78Heidegger, Oﬀ the Beaten Track, 19.
79Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, 44.
80Heidegger, “Comments.”
81Krell, 11.
82Heidegger, “Comments,” 18.
83Ibid. The German sentence is “Das besagt, das gegenständliche Korrelat solcher Einstellung hat den Grundgegen-
standscharakter der objektiven Sache”; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Band 9, 21.
ENGLISH STUDIES 653
observations he wants to make.84 Heidegger questions whether this preconception “enjoys
the level of primordiality that is claimed for it” and whether the motives which drive
Jaspers along his interrogative path are made evident.85 For Heidegger clearly they are
not. Jaspers believes that his method, which he calls “mere observation”, can observe
“simply that which exists and is there for us so far in human experience.86 But this
ignores the historicised nature of all observation, the fact that “our observing of phenom-
ena of life is historical, insofar as it must inevitably be interpretive”.87 In order to under-
stand the methodology that observation entails I must interpret its nature within the
context where it occurs. As Heidegger’s Being and Time puts it, any “interpretation
which is to contribute understanding must already have understood what is to be inter-
preted”.88 Thus the prejudices and presuppositions which direct observation must be
examined and interpreted, and this is what Jaspers neglects to consider.
Heidegger’s criticism of Jaspers is helpful here because we see the same kind of “blind-
ness” in Eliot’s Hamlet essay, which assumes a straightforward, unexamined and suppo-
sedly “objective” correlation between the intentions of the artist and the reception of
the audience. Heidegger concludes his essay by arguing that “mere observation” must
evolve “into an ‘inﬁnite process’ of radical questioning that always includes itself in its
questions and preserves itself in them”.89 Essentially he requires constant cognisance of
the hermeneutic circle which, if ignored, makes “mere observation” a phenomenologically
naive and misguided process—a criticism as valid for Eliot as it is for Jaspers. As an aside,
Eliot does mention Heidegger’s name a few times in his letters and in The Criterion in
1932, but that is unfortunately the extent of their engagement.90
IV.
Another philosopher who Eliot not only read, but whose lectures he also attended at the
Collège de France for two months during his 1910–11 sojourn in Paris was Henri Bergson
(1859–1941).91 Eliot even admitted to a “temporary conversion to Bergsonism”,92 though
after returning to Harvard he wrote an essay as part of his doctoral work speciﬁcally cri-
ticising what he saw as inconsistencies in Bergson’s philosophy.93 This graduate essay,
84Heidegger, “Comments,” 7.
85Ibid., 19.
86Ibid., 32. Heidegger is quoting Jaspers here.
87Heidegger, “Comments,” 33.
88Heidegger, Being and Time, 194.
89Heidegger, “Comments,” 37.
90Eliot, “Commentary,” 73. In 1930, in a letter to Erich Alport, Eliot writes “I should very much like also to read something of
Heidegger. During the month of August 1914, I sat in Marburg, smoking cigars and reading the works of Husserl, and I
still know just enough about the subject to be extremely interested in the work of a disciple.” In 1931, in a letter to
Stephen Spender, Eliot writes “Have you found anything worth reading? There is a philosopher named Martin Heideg-
ger—a disciple of the great Husserl, who really is good, I think, though far from lucid—whom I have been agonising
over.” See Eliot, Letters, vol. 5, 228, 529. The phrasing is ambiguous, leaving us to guess whether Eliot means agonising
over whether or not to read Heidegger, or instead, agonising over Being and Time itself. Sein und Zeit was published in
1927 in Husserl’s Jahrbuch and established Heidegger’s international reputation as a philosopher, solidifying his early
academic career. While Heidegger had published some other texts around the time Eliot was writing these letters it
seems likely that if he did read anything by Heidegger it would have been Sein und Zeit.
91See Hargrove for an account of what Eliot’s experience of Paris would have been like.
92Eliot, Sermon, 5.
93Dating this manuscript on Bergson has proved puzzling for Eliot scholars, though most agree that it was either written in
1913 or 1914, after Eliot had returned to Harvard to write his PhD. See Habib, 61ﬀ. See also Le Brun; Eliot, Complete Prose,
vol. 1, 88, n. 2.
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Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism and another, The Relationship between Politics and
Metaphysics, both delivered by Eliot to the Harvard Philosophical Club around 1913–
14, are critical of Bergson.94 Evident from these essays, particularly the ﬁrst, is Eliot’s
strong familiarity with Bergson’s major works.95 While Bergson does not explicitly use
the term “objective correlate”, he alludes to ideas which clearly imply a sense of it.
These are developed in more of an aesthetic than a philosophical sense in his Time and
Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness.96 Bergson argues that the
“charm of poetry” is derived from the poet in “whom feelings develop into images, and
the images themselves into words”. When we, as readers, experience these images in
the poetry, we in turn experience the feelings that are the “emotional equivalents” of
the ones experienced by the poet; to paraphrase Bergson, we think and see with the
poet.97 He goes on to write that the aim of art is to impress feelings on us, rather than
to induce us to express them: the artwork “suggests them to us, and willingly dispenses
with the imitation of nature when it ﬁnds some more eﬃcacious means”.98
This aesthetic emotion is experienced with varying degrees of intensity. It may scarcely
distract us from our immediate involvement with the world; it may brieﬂy draw our atten-
tion away from that involvement; or, most intensely, it may engross us and “monopolize
our souls”.99 The “merit” of a work of art is measured by the intensity and richness of the
aesthetic emotion it evokes. Bergson connects this emotion with the artist herself, stating
that the feelings and thoughts communicated to us by the artwork convey in them a
history of the artist, her lifeworld and experiences. Thus the aim of the artist is to
enable us to experience the complexity of emotion which she “cannot make us under-
stand”.100 The artist will attempt to communicate these indeﬁnable psychological states
by capturing them in the artwork: “the richer in ideas and the more pregnant with sen-
sation and emotions is the feeling within whose limits the artist has brought us, the
deeper and the higher shall we ﬁnd the beauty thus expressed”.101 The successful experi-
ence of art is meant to “put to sleep” the resistant powers of our own personality, and bring
us to a “state of perfect responsiveness” such that we can sympathise with the feeling
expressed in the artwork. Exactly how and why some artwork can achieve this intensity
of experience and others not is underdeveloped and somewhat obtuse in Bergson. Essen-
tially the purpose of art is to express beauty, and the essence of the beautiful “remains
unexplained”.102 He suggests that we “instinctively distinguish degrees of depth” in our
encounter with the artwork, reﬂected in the history of the artist.103
Examining Eliot’s graduate essay Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism shows that he
was explicitly attentive to these ideas of aesthetic intensity and their communicability in
94Eliot, Complete Prose, vol. 1, 67–105. For an overview of what these graduate essays discuss see Brooker and Schuchard’s
introduction in Eliot, Complete Prose, vol. 1, xxxvii–xxxviii, xl–xli.
95Eliot references Bergson’s L’Évolution Créatice (1907) [Creative Evolution], Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Con-
science (1889) [Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness] (1889) and Matière et Mémoire:
Essai sur la Relation du Corps a l’Esprit (1896) [Matter and Memory].
96Eliot obviously uses the original French version. The ﬁrst English translation appeared in 1910.
97Habib, 45. See Bergson, 15.
98Bergson, 17.
99Ibid., 17
100Ibid., 18.
101Ibid.
102Ibid., 14.
103Ibid., 17. My emphasis.
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Time and Free Will, referencing them closely and describing one passage by Bergson, in
this context, as “remarkable”.104 Evidently there are strong parallels that Eliot’s “objective
correlative” shares with Bergson’s aesthetic theory of emotion. Both suggest that in the
encounter with the successful artwork an “emotional equivalence” will emerge which res-
onates between the artist and audience. This allows a communication to occur which, in its
fullness, has the capacity to “monopolize our soul”. Eliot suggests thatMacbeth oﬀers such
an equivalence, because the artwork is able to successfully convey the emotions of guilt and
horror which Shakespeare intends. Bergson is also explicit about the role of the artist; her
lifeworld and experience are encapsulated and communicated in the artwork. While Eliot
is not as explicit about this dimension in his theory of the “objective correlative”, it is
implied.
V.
In conclusion it is evident that there are many lines of inﬂuence which can be drawn to
Eliot’s “objective correlative”. However, there is no single, direct source for the notion.
The term is his own, but also ﬁts within the broader currents of thought that surrounded
him, and to which he was exposed, most notably the remnants of Hegelian idealism. For
the idealist, mind and reality cohere. Rationality allows us to uncover and discern its truth,
particularly in the encounter with the artwork. The successful artwork is able to distil some
aspects of this truth, which the mind, as Bergson suggests, is “instinctively” able to com-
prehend because it is attuned to recognise and appreciate beauty when it encounters it.
We cannot discount entirely the inﬂuence, even unconscious, of the work of Washing-
ton Allston, given the Unitarianism of Eliot’s youth and its entanglement with Transcen-
dentalism. Nor can we discount the inﬂuence Forbes may have had on Eliot through his
familial relationship to Emerson, and the possibility that he may have introduced Eliot to
Allston’s painting, and even mentioned his aesthetic theory. Thus, in spite of Eliot’s pro-
testation regarding his original claim to the term, perhaps its embryonic form had already
implanted itself in his early intellectual development.
While it is convenient to argue that the term’s actual inspiration was Husserl and that
Eliot merely appropriated it, this claim is not so straightforward to substantiate, especially
given the edition of Logical Investigations which Eliot read. One could even go so far as to
argue that Eliot’s 1956 preface, where he mentions somewhat incredulously Allston’s claim
to the term, provided an ideal opportunity to acknowledge Husserl’s inﬂuence. The fact
that he did not do so suggests that it did not occur to him, because he probably had no
recollection that the term was Husserl’s, and that he might have encountered a German
version of it ﬁrst in Logical Investigations. Also, it is evident from the above discussion
that Husserl is using the term in a complex phenomenological sense, whereas Eliot’s
use is much less developed, and closer to idealism. The two conceptions are diﬀerent to
such an extent that if Eliot did appropriate the term from Husserl (which we cannot
entirely discount given the temporal proximity of his reading and annotating Logical
Investigations and writing “Hamlet and His Problems”) then it was only as an unconscious
borrowing of the expression itself, and not the particular way Husserl develops it.
However, it seems likely that the conﬂuence of Husserl and Meinong, and their
104Eliot, Complete Prose, vol. 1, 67–8.
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widespread use of the term Gegenstand in its various philosophic iterations, must have
played some role in Eliot’s development of his own term.
This leaves us to consider Bergson and Bradley, who both provide ideas which, I think,
strongly and evidently inﬂuenced Eliot’s development of his “objective correlative”. We
know that Eliot wrote critically on Bergson as part of his PhD studies, around 1913–14,
speciﬁcally mentioning his aesthetic emotive theory, which is very similar to Eliot’s
own. Bergson’s claim for an “emotional equivalence” communicated from the artist to
the audience corresponds very strongly to Eliot’s own claims for an “exact equivalence”,
a “complete adequacy of the external to the emotion”. In the case of Bradley we can
also discern clear lines of thought which reverberate through Eliot’s work, both in his
thesis and his literary theory. Bradley’s claims, that every idea produces a corresponding
emotion, and that emotions are themselves indelibly linked to objects, are beliefs central to
Eliot’s own “objective correlative”. Furthermore, these ideas are quoted by Eliot in his own
PhD thesis, in agreement with Bradley, which strongly suggests that Eliot valued them and
considered them worth reﬂecting on. Eliot goes so far as to write that “emotion is really
part of the object”, a philosophical claim which forms the basis for his aesthetic theory
in “Hamlet and His Problems”. Some years later, in his 1961 address “To Criticize the
Critic”, Eliot states that “I have written best about writers who have inﬂuenced my own
poetry… I include F. H. Bradley, whose work—I might say whose personality as mani-
fested in his works—aﬀected me profoundly”.105 I believe we have licence here to go
beyond Eliot’s poetry, and to include his criticism in this claim.
What is evident is that, while there is no clear, direct source for Eliot’s term it emerged
in the mind of someone who was attuned to and perceptive of the signiﬁcant philosophical
and aesthetic ideas of his time, and who drew from his considerable and varied intellectual
experience in developing his literary criticism. He was aware of the ongoing conversation
about the nature of objects and how we experience them, but his conception of the “objec-
tive correlative” owes more to the older idealist tradition, and Bergson’s aesthetic develop-
ment of it, than to the fully phenomenological approach seen in Husserl and Heidegger.
The term remains an important feature of early twentieth-century literary theory and its
inﬂuence and importance, though diminished in terms of application, remain signiﬁcant
as an encapsulation of, in the words of Eliot, “the mind of my generation”.106
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